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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Thomas LaMar Dewsnup,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

Case No. 14408

vs.
Bailey's Moving and Storage
Company, a corporation, and
Allied Van Lines, a corporation,
Defendants and
Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT BAILEY'S MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained in a tractor and semi-trailer rollover accident.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a split Special Verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the sum of $329,364.31, of which $250,000.00 was
awarded as general damages (R. 1000-1003).

The general damage

award exceeded the amount prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint by
$50,000.00 (R. 675-681) and the trial court reduced the general
damage award to $200,000.00 and entered judgment in the total sum
of $279,364.31, but retained jurisdiction of the matter until it
ruled on whether plaintiff was entitled to the $50,000.00 general
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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damages awarded in excess of the amount prayed for in his complaint (R. 107). The trial court subsequently ruled in favor
of plaintiff and entered an Order Amending Judgment on the
Verdict which increased the judgment to a total of $329f364.31
(R. 1075).

The trial court also entered judgments in favor of

defendant Allied Van Lines on its cross-claim against defendant
Bailey1s Moving and Storage Company in the same amounts as
awarded in favor of plaintiff against both defendants.
The motion of defendants Bailey's Moving and Storage Company
and Allied Van Lines for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
in the alternative for a new trial which raised the issues of
excessive damages, insufficiency of the testimony of plaintiff's
expert and of errors in law committed by the trial court (R. 10141015) was denied (R. 1072).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company seeks reversal
of the judgments awarded against it in favor of the plaintiff and
cross-claimant Allied Van Lines on the ground that plaintiff's
evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, and consequently the judgment over against
it in favor of the cross-claimant Allied Van Lines; or in the
alternative for a new trial on the grounds that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in receiving certain evidence as
more specifically set forth hereinafter; or in the alternative
that the judgments in question be modified to award no more
general damages than prayed for in plaintiff's Complaint.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(Recited most favorably to plaintiff)
The plaintiff was employed in March, 1967 (Abs. 24) as a
lease-operator driver by defendant Baileyfs Moving and Storage
Company, a local agent of defendant Allied Van Lines. He was
the owner and. operator of a 1967 Peterbilt tractor which was
leased to defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company and
used to pull a 1967 forty-foot Electronics Van semi-trailer,
which was leased to defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company by C & J Bailey, a partnership.

Plaintiff operated this

combination rig for approximately seventeen months (Abs. 20)
traveling in excess of 100,000 miles (Abs. 23) before the accident in question occurred on August 3, 1968.
In the fall of 1967, plaintiff noticed a rattle which had
developed in the rear end of the trailer and "cupping" wear on
the trailer tires (Abs. 20). In the summer of 1968 when he was
in Sacramento, California, another driver told him his rear end
suspension was loose and he then noticed that the front torsion
bar was "sloppy" (Abs. 20).
When he returned to Salt Lake City, Mr. Linnell, manager of
Bailey's Moving and Storage, told him to take the trailer to
Utility Trailer and have it checked.

Mr. Lee Wareham at Utility

Trailer examined the trailer and told him repairs would cost
approximately $600.00 and take four days to complete. Mr. Linnell
did not authorize repairs at that time and told him they had a
shipment that had to go and asked him if he knew of someone else
who could look at it. (Abs. 21).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At plaintiff's suggestion and Mr. Linnell's consent (Abs. 24),
plaintiff took the trailer to Slim Olson's where Mr. Dell Rees
repaired the front torsion bar by shimming it (Abs. 21, 71-72).
This work was done on May 22, 1968 (Abs. 72). After this work
i

was completed, the trailer was considerably quieter (Abs. 21) and
plaintiff did not consider he had any problem with it after that
time (Abs. 24).
On August 1, 1968, three days before the accident on
August 3, 1968, plaintiff signed as driver, the thirty-day
inspection report made by Mr. Gilbert Wilburn, Baileyfs
mechanic, which stated above his signature, "All defective
items listed herein have been corrected."

This report indicated

that the tires, wheels and suspension system of both the tractor
and trailer as being okay (Abs. 25). Also, the plaintiff, as
driver, filled out daily inspection reports up to the time
of the accident indicating that the tires and steering were
okay, and until the accident occurred, he had no complaints
regarding the running gear of either the tractor or trailer
(Abs. 25). Even after the accident, he made no complaints to
either Slim Olson or Bailey's of any defect in the tractor or
trailer (Abs. 25).
Plaintiff acknowledges that Mr. Rees told him the shimming
job he did was a temporary repair and plaintiff expected to have
further work done on the suspension system, but he drove a minimum of 12,000 from the date the repair work was done to the date
of the accident (Abs. 27).
The accident in question occurred on an old narrow two-lane
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

highway at a point of substantial downgrade (Abs. 4) approximately
one-tenth of a mile downhill from the crest of the hill (Abs. 3 ) .
The right duals went off the right side of the road and traveled
approximately 225 feet before they came back on the blacktop
where the rig veered across the road and off the left shoulder.
The left shoulder of the road is a steep embankment and the rig
was airborne for approximately forty-eight feet as it went off the
left shoulder.

The rig turned on its left side as it hit the

ground and then skidded on its side for an additional ninety feet
ten inches (Abs. 3 & Exh. 15).
The maximum distance the right duals went off the right
shoulder was four feet (Abs. 3 ) . The left duals left no marks
upon the blacktop during the time the right wheels traveled the
225 feet off the blacktop on the right shoulder, but both the
right and left duals left scuff marks on the highway as the rig
came back across the road to the left as it crossed and went off
the left shoulder (Exhs. 9 & 15).

These marks indicated the

brakes were not applied at the time they were made (Abs. 3 ) .
There were no tire marks on the roadway prior to the point where
the right duals went off on the right shoulder (Exh. 15).
Plaintiff's first notice of the accident was a feeling as
though he had been rear ended by a car.

He was thrown forward

and the rig was jerked off the right side of the road.

He

glanced in the rear view mirror and saw the trailer coming behind
him in a jackknifed position to his left (Abs. 22-23).
The plaintiff's sons, Kendall who was nine years old at the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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time of the accident, and Alan, who was fourteen years old at the
time of the accident, both stated that the first thing they
recalled about the accident was a loud bang.

The next thing they

both heard was the screeching of tires on the asphalt as the
truck veered off the right side of the road (Abs. 13 & 15).
However, both Kendall (Abs. 14) and Alan (Abs. 15) acknowledged
that when their depositions were taken in December, 1971, they
had not mentioned anything about a bang occurring prior to the
rig going off the right hand side of the roadway.

They both

acknowledged that when their depositions were taken that they
testified that at the time of the accident it felt like their
trailer brakes had locked up (Abs. 14 & 16).

Alan also testified

that in discussions with his father at the hospital after the
accident, his father told him that it seemed to him like the
brakes had set up.

His father never gave him any other explana-

tion as to the cause of the accident (Abs. 17).
The accident was investigated by Officer Ritchie of the
Wyoming Highway Patrol.

His investigation consisted of inspect-

ing the vehicle, taking photographs and making measurements of
the scene.

From his measurements, he prepared Exhibit 15 (Abs.

3).
From his inspection of the vehicle, he did not remember
seeing any blown tires or steering defects (Abs. 4 ) . However,
the estimate of repairs to plaintiff's tractor shows one tire
with fifty percent wear requiring replacement (Exh. 48).
Officer Ritchie did notice a fresh break in what he termed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a spring shackle (correctly designated a frame bracket) on the
right rear tandem of the trailer.

During the half an hour or

longer while he was in the immediate area of the vehicle inspecting and taking pictures, he did not notice anything unusual about
the front or rear torsion bars running between the front and rear
dual wheels (Abs. 5). Other than the broken shackle on the right
rear of the trailer/ he did not observe anything else in the
suspension system that appeared to be broken or out of place
(Abs. 5 ) .
With respect to the duals, the back one was canted slightly
to one side.

He explained that the duals looked straighter in

photograph 4-P than they did in 5-P and 4-P is the photograph
looking down from the tractor toward the back of the trailer
(Abs. 5-6).
He made no attempt to take a photograph showing the fractured
spring shackle (Abs. 6 ) .
After being recalled, Officer Ritchie stated that the two
Dewsnup boys at the scene of the accident told him that they
heard a loud noise and the truck jerked or lurched and their
father started fighting the steering wheel to control the vehicle
and it then went back across the road and over the embankment
(Abs. 6 ) . He also had a conversation with George Mason, the
wrecker driver, who stated they would have to chain the rear
axle ahead before they tipped it over.

However, he was not with

Mr. Mason when the latter righted the rig and brought it back to
Casper (Abs. 7 ) .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trailer was righted and brought back to Casper, Wyoming
by George Mason who owns Mason Wrecker Service.

Mr. Mason came

i

to the scene with two rigs, a twin-boom wrecker and oil field
wrecker, one of which was operated by his employee.

They up-

righted the trailer without unloading it, brought it onto the
highway, turned it around and brought it back to Casper.

<

They

used the oil field tractor equipped with a fifth wheel, but due
to the length of the unit, they were unable to lock the trailer
within the fifth wheel of the tractor and therefore secured it
by a chain and winch line while they towed it back to Casper.
They did not change any tires or do anything to the rear wheels
of the trailer to make them tow properly.

They experienced no

difficulty in towing the trailer into Casper (Abs. 18-19).
Mr. Mason stated he did not remember telling plaintiff's
counsel in 1971 that one of the air sacs on the suspension system
was collapsed nor did he at this time remember one of the sacs
being collapsed (Abs. 19).
The trailer was brought, back to Bailey!s yard at Ogden, Utah
by Mr. Wilford Bingham.

Mr. Bingham picked the trailer up at

Masonfs lot in Casper, Wyoming.

He put some bands around the

front part of the trailer compartment (front end) where it had
been broken open in the accident, but he made no repairs to the
tires or suspension system.

Mr. Mason said nothing to him about

any chain on the suspension system and he did not see one. After
he checked the tires, brakes, turn signals and stop lights, he
pulled the trailer back to Ogden at speeds of approximately 50
miles per hour without incident (Abs. 66).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

The trailer was eventually brought to Utility Trailer's yard
in Salt Lake City where it sat for approximately one and one-half
years before it was repaired (Abs. 9 ) . Utility Trailer purchased
the trailer as salvage to rebuild and sell (Abs* 8 ) . At the time
repair work commenced, Mr. Robert Lee Wareham, the shop foreman,
observed that one frame bracket had broken loose from where it had
been welded to the frame, two of the four air bags were blown and
it was blocked between the frame and the beams to hold the trailer
up.

Also# one axle was chained forward to make the trailer tow-

able (Abs. 8) .
Mr. Wareham did not know how long the trailer had been sitting
elsewhere before it was brought to Utility's yard or what may have
happened to it before it got to Utility's yard (Abs. 9 ) . He stated
that the entire trailer, including the suspension system was rebuilt by Utility Trailer after the accident.

He assumed that the

break in the frame bracket, as well as all of the other damage he
observed, occurred in the accident. (Abs. 9 ) .

Mr. Wareham could

not even estimate the year when Utility Trailer repaired the
trailer because it has been seven years since he worked for Utility
(Abs. 10).
The frame bracket that was torn loose along the weld line
was rewelded back to the frame.

There was also other welding done

such as welding breaks in the cross members of the trailer floor
(Abs. 10).
Both torsion bars were in place when Mr. Wareham inspected
the undercarriage approximately a year and a half after the
accident (Abs. 11).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The parts list for the repair work performed on the trailer
after the accident indicated one tire was recapped, one tube was
replaced, one torsion bar was replaced and one bushing was replaced.
The total cost of repairing the trailer was $4,315.00. (Abs. 12).
According to Mr. Wareham's best recollection, it was the left
front frame bracket that was broken at the weld line (Abs. 12).
A trailer was also worked on by Mr. Arnold Schmidt who was
a working foreman on the night shift for Utility Trailer in 1967.
He remembers seeing the trailer being brought into the yard by a
wrecker, but he did not examine it at that time.

He did not

recall any kind of a chain around the suspension system and did
not recall seeing a broken frame bracket when he worked on the
trailer, but stated it may have been welded up by the day shift
before he noticed it. (Abs. 59). He did notice one of the torsion
bars not being properly in place.

The bolt which holds the tor-

sion bar in place had a notch worn out where it fits through the
slot into the torsion bar.

At each end of both torsion bars, a

steel plate had been welded on the beam and two of these plates
were still in position, but one plate on the front bar and one
plate on the rear bar were missing.

The U bolts which hold the

axle under the trailer on the beam were also twisted and replaced.
(Abs. 58) .
Mr. Schmidt did not know when the accident in question
occurred, or what had been done with the trailer prior to the
time it came into Utility's yard or prior to the time Utility
commenced working on it.

He had no way of identifying the trailer

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in his memory other than it being a Bailey!s trailer.

He had

worked on other Bailey's trailers, but did not recall any others
having as extensive damage. (Abs. 58-60).
However, Mr. Schmidt recalled that the trailer he was talking
about was worked on in about April, 1967. He started to work for
Utility on February 1, 1967 and estimates that he started working
on the trailer of which he was speaking in April, 1967, approximately
two months after he was hired (Abs. 59-60).
After being rebuilt by Utility Trailer, the trailer in question was sold to Bender Moving Company of Reno, Nevada.

Shortly

before trial, the trailer was examined by Mr. Melvin Mullikin of
Universal Testing Company who stated that his examination revealed
that the left front frame bracket and some supporting members
thereof had been welded to the frame more than once (Abs. 68).
Plaintifffs expert, Mr. Lionel George Wildey, stated that,
in his opinion, the accident in question was caused by a torsion
bar coming part way out of one of the frame brackets which would
transfer additional load to the opposite frame bracket and this
overstressing might be sufficient to tear the opposite frame
bracket from the chassis, which would then allow the whole axle
to pivot and cause the trailer to push the tractor off the road
(Abs. 34). Mr. Wildey stated that he had not examined the failed
parts and the sum total of the evidence available to him upon
which he based his theory of ground-induced steering was the
photographs (Abs. 36). However, he acknowledged that he had
carefully examined the photographs and that the best evidence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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from the photographs is that the torsion bars were still in place
after the accident (Abs. 36). Further, Mr. Wildey admitted that
in arriving at his opinion, he had to make assumptions that are
not demonstrated in the photographs (Tr. 274 (reference inadvertently omitted in abstract)).
Mr. Wildey explained that the screeching sound heard by the
Dewsnup boys at the beginning of the accident sequence was the
misaligned duals being drug along the paved surface of the roadway (Abs. 37), which action he would expect to leave scuff marks
on the highway, but admitted there was no evidence of any such
scuff marks (Abs. 39).
Mr. Wildey also acknowledged that the only evidence he had
of the misaligned axles which caused the ground-induced steering
is the photographs, and that since one of the frame brackets had
been sheared at the time the photographs were taken, there would
be a sideways tension by gravity pull of the wheels and beams of
the suspension system and that the axles would not be expected to
be in perfect alignment as the trailer laid on its side when the
photographs were taken.

Mr. Wildey admitted that the photographs

do not permit a determination of when the misalignment first took
place, but explained "It's all we have got". (Abs. 38, Tr. 262).
He admitted that it is possible that the frame bracket broke in
the impact (Abs. 40).
Mr. Wildey had never had occasion to examine an accident
involving a similar type suspension system.

He had not previously

examined any trailers where a torsion bar had purportedly come
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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out and he has had no experience with the particular suspension
system in question (Abs. 41).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OPINION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS
WAS BASED ON SPECULATION AND IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT
The jury was instructed to return a Special Verdict in
which the issue of defendant Bailey's Moving § Storage Company's
liability was set out in interrogatories which submitted the
issues of whether the accident was caused by a defect, was the
defendant Bailey negligent, did defendant Bailey breach its
agreement with plaintiff to inspect and maintain the trailer so
that it was safe to operate with the tractor, and if the findings
were in the affirmative, whether one or both of said issues
were proximate causes of the accident.
The primary question in this appeal is whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find there was a defect in
the trailer which caused the accident.
To establish the defect, plaintiff relied upon the testimony
of an expert, Lionel George Wildey, who said that in his opinion
the plaintiff lost control of the unit because of "ground
induced steering" by the trailer, which would take charge of
the tractor, forcing it off the road.

He stated this resulted

from a misalignment or malalignment of the trailer axles which,
in his opinion, was caused by a torsion bar coming part-way out
of one of the frame brackets. This transferred additional load
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to the opposite frame bracket causing over-stress, which may
have been sufficient to tear the opposite frame bracket from

(

the trailer chassis, allowing the whole axle to pivot, causing
the trailer to head toward the west (plaintifffs right) and
push the tractor off the road to the east (plaintiff1s left)

{

(Abs. 34). Wildey had not examined the damaged parts, and he
based his theory of "ground induced steering" solely on photographs of the rear dual wheels and tractor suspension system
taken at the scene after the accident occurred (Abs, 36), He
acknowledged that he had carefully examined the photos and that
they showed the torsion bars were still in place after the
accident (Abs. 36). Further, he admitted that in forming his
opinion, he had to make assumptions that are not demonstrated
in the photos.

His testimony on cross-examination is quoted

verbatim as follows:
Q. Actually, Mr. Wildey, in looking at
these photographs with the torsion bar
still in place as you look at the photographs,
that fact alone tends to discount the theory that
you have about how this accident occurred-A.

i

Well, we can f t-'i

Q. Let me finish the question. You have to
make assumptions that are not demonstrated in the
photographs?
A.

That is true.

Q. In other words, if you just took the photographic evidence alone, from what you can see of
that suspension system, you would have to say that
those torsion bars still appear to be in place?
A.

Or out of place and just resting.

Q. Yes. And you can't see that they are out
of place in the photographs?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. There is no conclusive evidence in the
photographs. I am using my experience in assessing the self-induced -- the ground induced steering
theory.
Wildey's testimony on cross-examination was speculative
as to which torsion bar came out of which frame bracket, causing
the frame bracket on the opposite side to tear out. After
repeated questions, he finally concluded that the torsion bar
"drifted out from the right side."
me

He said:

Q. If it is one or the other, it seems to
it is a possibility.

A. It is reasonable that it drifted out
from the right side.
Q. Well, is that the testimony that you
want to say is the basis of your opinion?
A.

Yes. Yes.

Q. I mean pick whichever one you want, but
is this the one?
A.

Yes, I think so, yes.

Q. And so then that breaks the left -- the
left rear frame bracket?
A. That could possibly break the left rear frame
bracket and tear it loose at the frame.
Q. Well, you keep telling me that it possibly
could, so I guess it possibly couldn't. Is it
your testimony that it did?
A. Well, without examining the failed parts,
I have to make a probability kind of a statement.
Q. Well, as a practical matter, Mr. Wildey,
isn't it true that you are basing your opinion
on the fact that there is an apparent misalignment
of the rear axles of this trailer that you have
examined from the photographs?
A. That is true. I am basing my whole
theory on its ground induced steering.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

Q. And the fact is you havenft really considered anything else other than merely looking
at those photographs, have you?

<

A. That is the sum total of the available
evidence that I can examine. (Tr. 252).
Wildey qualified his theory that the torsion bar came out of
the frame bracket by saying it was a "very strong possibility."
He did not rule out that it could have worked vice versa (Tr.
251)

Officer Ritchie, who investigated the accident, observed

the bracket (he termed it a spring shackle) on the right rear
tandem axle of the trailer was broken, that the break appeared
fresh, there was no rust in it (Abs. 4). Other than the

i

broken shackle on the right rear of the trailer, the officer
did not observe anything else in the suspension system that
appeared to be broken or out of place (Abs. 5). It is significant that Wildey testified it was possible that the frame
bracket was broken in the impact (Abs. 40).
Wildey said that the "screeching sound" heard by the
Dewsnup boys at the beginning of events in the accident sequence
was caused by the misaligned dual wheels being dragged along
the paved surface of the roadway (Abs. 37), which he would
expect to leave scuff marks on the highway, but admitted that
there was no evidence of any such scuff marks.

He conceded

that the photos do not permit a determination of when the
misalignment first took place because the axles would not be
expected to be in alignment as the trailer lay on its side
after the frame bracket had been sheared.

Referring to the

photos, he said, "It's all we got" (Abs. 38, Tr. 262).
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It is elementary that for the opinion of an expert witness to be admissible in evidence, a sufficient foundation
must be laid to show that his conclusions are based upon
evidence adduced in the case.

In Day vs. Lorenzo Smith § Son, Inc.,

17 U.2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), this Court, in reversing a
judgment in favor of the defendant because the trial court
erroneously permitted a highway patrolman to testify as to
point of impact between two vehicles, said:
An expert or skilled witness can give an
opinion upon facts previously testified to by
him, but not on facts known to him but not
communicated to the jury. The witness must
testify as to the facts upon which he bases his
opinion and the facts should be related to the
opinion. Otherwise, the testimony would be of
little assistance to the court and jury, and
there would be no way of testing the validity of
the opinion.
Opinion testimony, such as Sherwood's, is
admissible only when the subject matter is such
that a jury cannot be expected to draw correct
inferences from the facts. There is no need for
expert opinion with reference to facts involving
commonplace occurrences. Expert testimony is
not admissible solely because the witness has
some skill in a particular field, but is admissible, if at all, only because the witness can
offer assistance on a matter not within the
knowledge or common experience of people of
ordinary intelligence.
Applying the foregoing principles to the
instant case, we hold that it was error to
permit Sherwood's testimony as to the point of
impact because his opinion was not supported by
sufficient facts and, what meager facts he did
testify to were not connected up or related to
his opinion. They were inadequate to support
his conclusion. (Emphasis added)
Wildey admitted that the photos taken of the trailer at the
scene of the accident showed the torsion bars were in place
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after the accident.
by the lay jury.

Incidentally, this could also be observed

His theory that the torsion bars could have

"drifted out" of the suspension assembly, caused the "ground
induced steering" and then returned to position after the
trailer came to rest is pure speculation.

That the torsion

bar or bars did not come partially out of the assembly to cause
a misalignment of the axles is supported by the undisputed
evidence that there were no scuff marks left by the left dual
wheels on the asphalt surface of the roadway before the right
dual wheels went off the hard surface onto the shoulder, or
even after the right duals

were off on the right shoulder and

the left duals were traveling on the paved surface of the
roadway.

If the rear dual axle had pivoted, causing the

driver to lose control as theorized by Wildey, considering the
weight of the trailer, which was 2/3 loaded (Tr. 165), and had
a capacity of 21,000 pounds (Tr. 169), there would have to be
tire scuff marks left on the driving surface
dual wheel.

by the left

According to Officer Ritchie's investigation, the

unit traveled a distance of 225 feet partially off the roadway
surface, with the right wheels

on the shoulder and the left

wheels on the surface, no scuff marks were left before the
unit went onto the shoulder, or during the 225 feet the left
wheels continued on the driving surface.

The first scuff

marks left by the wheels on both sides of the unit appeared at
the point where the rig made the abrupt left turn across the
highway and went off the left shoulder of the highway, travelin
48 feet through
air W.before
hitting
theLawbarrow
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slid on its side another 90 feet 10 inches.

Certainly, if the

unit left scuff marks because of the abrupt left turn across
the highway, the conclusion is inescapable that if the rear
trailer axle had pivoted, causing misalignment of the dual
wheels, it would not only cause friction marks on the roadway
surface, but there would also be evidence of damage to the
tires, neither of which was observed after the accident.
Haarstrich vs. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 U.552, 262 P. 100
(1927), states the general principle that testimony contrary
to uncontroverted physical facts does not constitute substantial
evidence.

If this rule is applicable to the testimony of a

witness concerning an observed event, it should certainly
apply to the opinion of an expert witness based upon the
examination of photographs of a vehicle after the accident,
which, in and of themselves, do not support his opinion.
The legal principle is well established that the testimony
of a witness on direct examination is no stronger than that
elicited in cross-examination.

Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 U.2d

16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954); State vs. Pratt, 25 U.2d 76, 475 P.2d
1013 (1970) . The following language from Alvarado is pertinent
to the situation regarding the lack of evidence of a defect in
the trailer:
The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove
the charge of speeding. Such a finding of fact
could not be based upon mere speculation or conjecture, but only on a preponderance of the evidence.
It is well established that if the probabilities as to
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more causes and defendant would be liable only under one set
of fact, plaintiff has failed in his proof.

The Utah Supreme

\

Court in Perrin vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 59 Utah
1, 201 P. 405 (1921) quoted with approval the following
(

principle:
If the probabilities are equally balanced that
the accident was produced by a cause for which the
defendant is responsible or by one for which he is
not, the plaintiff must fail. Tremelling vs. Southern
Pacific Company, 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80,

<

which principle was reaffirmed in Alvarado vs. Tucker,
supra.

In discussing plaintiff's obligation to prove a

particular fact by a "preponderance of the evidence" the
Court stated:
A choice of probabilities does not meet this
requirement. It creates only a basis for conjecture, on which a verdict of the jury cannot stand.
In the case at bar, it is clear in considering
Wildey's testimony in its entirety, as it must be
considered, Alvarado vs. Tucker, supra, that his opinion is
based merely on the possibility that a torsion bar might have
drifted out of the frame bracket on one side of the suspension
system causing the frame bracket on the other side to break.
He acknowledged that his only evidence of the torsion bar
being out is the photographs, but that in the photographs "it
looks as though it is still in place" and that to support his
opinion, one has "to make assumptions that are not demonstrated
in the photographs."
Further, he acknowledges that the misalighment of the
axles shown in the photographs are as consistent with the
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frame bracket having been "broken in the impact" (a circumstance
for which defendants would not be liable) as that the broken
bracket was the cause of the accident.

Such being the case,

the jury could not have found from a "preponderance of the
evidence" whether the frame bracket broke and caused the accident,
or was broken in the accident.

They would have had to speculate

to arrive at either conclusion, and such speculation is not
sufficient to sustain a verdict.

See Denny v. St. Mark's Hospital,

21 U.2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968) where plaintiff claimed an
x-ray technician had injured her neck in positioning her for
x-rays and plaintiff's expert, Dr. Hebertsen, testified such
positioning could have injured plaintiff's neck, but his opinion
was not otherwise supported in the evidence.

In affirming a

directed verdict for defendant, this Court stated:
Such testimony is not sufficient to enable a
jury to do more than speculate as to what was
the cause of plaintiff's troubles.
In the case of Price vs. Ashby's Incorporated, 11 U.2d 54,
354 P.2d 1064 (1960), plaintiff's evidence went further than
in the present case and did show a defect to exist in plaintiff's
automobile which failed to negotiate a curve, but did not
establish that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of
the accident.

In affirming the trial court's dismissal of

the action, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the
Court observed:
The highway where the car left the road was
in all respects normal and was a smooth oiled
surface. The car could have left the road for
any one or more of a number of reasons. For example,
a driver could have been momentarily dozing or could
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There is no evidence here that the driver ever
attempted to turn the steering wheel to cause the
car to go to the left with the road. With two or
more possible causes such as an inattentive driver
and a mechanical defect that would have made it
harder to turn; proof that it may have been either
is not proof that it was in fact either. No evidence
indicated that either cause was the more probable.
(Emphasis added).
Also, re Beardall vs. Murray, 27 U.2d 340, 496 P.2d 260
(1972), where this Court affirmed the trial court's refusal
to admit the testimony of an expert whose opinion was based
on factors not shown in the evidence to be present.

The

Court said:
. . . He arrived at his conclusion by use of
a formula relating to the physics of a hypothetical
case, based on weights, speeds of vehicles, angles
of travel, etc. which were not shown to be connected
with Those extant here. Under such circumstances
we cannot conclude that the court erred, as claimed
on appeal in sustaining an objection to the introduction of such testimony, - and we so hold.
POINT II
THE COURT'ERRED IN PERMITTING WITNESS RITCHIE
TO IMPEACH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS MASON
WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION HAVING BEEN LAID
The testimony of witness George Mason was introduced by
way of deposition.

In the direct examination of Mason, he was

asked the following question and answered as indicated:
Q. And when you then towed it in, did you have
to do anything to the rear wheels of the trailer
to make them tow properly?
A.

The best I can remember, no.

On cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel, no further questions were asked of Mason regarding the rear wheels of the
trailer.
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However, in the direct examination of witness Ritchie by
plaintiff1s counsel, the Court permitted, over defendant's
objection, Ritchie to testify that Mason told him in substance:
I'll have to chain (expletive) up before I can move it (Abs.
7, Tr. 131-133).
It was error to permit Mr. Ritchie to impeach the testimony of Mason without having first asked Mason about the
statement in question.

As stated by Justice Wolfe in Jensen

vs. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936):
Even where a witness states he does not remember any conversation with the proposed impeaching
witness, that part of the alleged conversation
which it is claimed would impeach him should be
called to his attention, for it may yet serve to
refresh his memory and give him the required
opportunity to deny it specifically, or, if
admitting to it, to qualify or explain it or
testify as he thinks it actually took place.n
Permitting Ritchie to so testify was extremely prejudicial to
defendant's case since it gave plaintiff an opportunity to impeach
one of defendant's important witnesses on a significant point
without giving said witness an opportunity to deny or explain the
statement in question.
The witness, Wilford Bingham, was sent to Casper, Wyoming, by
the defendant to bring the damaged trailer back to Utah. He inspected
the trailer, placed steel bands around the front of the trailer
compartment to secure it.
pension system.

There were no chains on the rear sus-

Before pulling the trailer on the return trip to

Salt Lake City, he checked the tires and brakes and made no alteration of any kind to the suspension system.

He towed the trailer

on the return
trip. He experienced no problem with towing the
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trailer at a speed of approximately 50 miles per hour (Abs. 56),
and noticed nothing unusual about the trailer while bringing it

<

back (Abs. 67).
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE TWO TIRES WHICH
HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE TRAILER PRIOR TO THE AXLES
BEING SHIMMED WHICH WERE NOT INDICATIVE OF THE
CONDITION OF THE SUSPENSION SYSTEM AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT
The Court admitted into evidence over defendant's objection

<

(

plaintiff's Exhibits 22 and 23, which were two tires which had been
on the trailer in question before the trailer was taken to
Slim Olson's Service Station for shimming and were not on the

{

trailer after the shimming work had been done, or at the time
of the accident.

The tires had large cups on their circumference

showing uneven wear.

The plaintiff testified that he did not

remember whether they came off the right or left side or off
the front or rear axles, but only that they were two of the
tires which had been on the trailer when he experienced the
rattling noise before the temporary repairs were made at Slim
Olson's.
The plaintiff further testified that the two tires in
question were taken off in the spring of 1968.
occurred in August, 1968.

The accident

He testified that Slim Olson shimmed

the torsion bars in May or June of 1968 and that the rattle
was considerably quieter after the shimming (Abs. 21, 22).
Thus, it is evidence that the condition of the torsion bars
had been altered since the excessive cupping wear to the tires
had taken place, and the condition of the tires was not probative
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

of any condition that existed at the time of the accident.
Further, since plaintiff could not testify what wheels or even
what axles the tires had come off from, and since Mr. Wildey's
opinion was that the rear axle was the one which was misaligned
and caused the accident, there was no foundation to support
admission of the tires into evidence.
Since the tires showed excessive wear which may have been
indicative of misalignment of the axle or wheels on which they
were mounted and thus an indication of faulty maintenance by
this defendant, admitting them into evidence was highly prejudicial
to this defendant.

They were large graphic exhibits and

undoubtedly influenced the jury as they stood before them
during several days of trial.

Defendant was subjected to all

of the unfavorable inferences which might be drawn from the
appearance of these tires when it had not been established
whether they were on the front or rear axle.

If they had been

on the front axle, the condition of the axle had been changed
prior to the accident, and, accordingly, the tires had nothing
to do with the accident and were not indicative of any condition
that existed at the time of the accident.
Even assuming that the tires gave an inference that this
defendant was negligent at some date prior to the accident, it
is elementary that prior negligence is not admissible to show
negligence on the date of the incident in question, especially
when there has been a change in the circumstances involving
the evidence purporting to show such prior negligence.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF GENERAL DAMAGES IN
EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT PRAYED FOR IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
The general law with respect to recovering damages greater than the amount plead is discussed in 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages,
Section 276, page 371, where it is stated:
While in the averments of damages it is not
necessary to be exact and the plaintiff's right of
action is not affected by the fact that he is
unable to sustain the allegation as to the amount
of damages or unable to prove damages in the amount
alleged, it is essential that the sum stated in the
conclusion be sufficient to cover the amount of
plaintiff's real demand, for in general the complainant cannot recover greater damages than the amount,
with interest, he has declared for and demanded in
his pleadings, nor may the award include amounts
not embraced within the averments of the complaint.
As a general rule, though, amendments which merely
increase the amount of damages claimed to have
arisen from the cause of action originally stated
in the pleadings may be allowed even as late as the
time of trial.
There is no statute nor case law in the State of Utah indicating

(

{

<

or holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in
excess of that which is set forth in the pleadings.

Rule

54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings.
This rule is similar to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The construction of Rule 54(c) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is discussed in 6 Moore's
Federal Practice, pages 1261 through 1271.

It is easily

understood from the reading of this treatise that the liberal
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approach to granting the relief a party is entitled to even
if such relief is not contained in the pleadings focuses on
the type of relief and not the amount.

This is clearly

indicated in the following statement.
If a party is entitled to any relief under the
facts as established by the pleadings or proof,
the claim will not be dismissed simply because
complainant has erred as to legal theory and is
not entitled to the relief prayed for. An amendment
to the prayer is not necessary to obtain the
substantive relief to which the claimant is entitled;
but is usually necessary if the claimant seeks to
change an equitable claim into a legal claim, or
vise versa, for the purpose of obtaining a jury or
court trial.
While appropriate relief should be granted,
this does not include relief as to a matter not
made out in the pleadings or proof; and ordinarily,
relief which neither party desires should not be
forced on them. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, pages
1264 through 1266. (Emphasis added.)
Many of our sister states hold that a verdict in excess
of that demanded in the complaint is erroneous.

In Smith vs. Tang,

100 Arizona 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), an action by a decedent!s
spouse against the estate for the recovery of certain funds
claimed to be owed here, the Court stated the following:
The general law with respect to a verdict for
more than the allegation of a complaint demand is
that the verdict is erroneous. 89 CJS Trial Section
506. As stated in 65 A.L.R.2d 1331:
"In the majority of cases where a verdict or
judgment entered upon such verdict was deemed
erroneous because exceeding amount of damages
claimed or demanded in the successful party's
pleadings, it has been held that a new trial
may be avoided by a remittur of the amount of
the excess."
In Bliss vs. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County,
244 P.2d 508
(Wyoming
1952),
a case
involving
the adequacy of a
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condemnation award, in refusing to allow a judgment for damages
greater than that for which it was plead, the Court stated:
The authorities seem to bear out the contention.
Thus it is said in 23 Cyc. 795, 796:
"It is a general rule that a judgment
cannot properly be rendered for a greater sum,
whether by way of debt or damages, than is
claimed or demanded by plaintiff in his declaration or complaint. And it is immaterial that
the evidence may prove a greater debt or a
greater amount of damage than was alleged by
plaintiff."
Numerous cases as cited. In 25 CJS, Damages,
Section 143, page 787, it is stated that:
"Plaintiff is precluded from recovering
but not from proving, a greater sum than that
alleged in the petition or complaint."
In 15 Am.Jur., Section 309, page 751, we find it
said that:
"In general the plaintiff cannot recover
greater damages than he has declared for and
demanded in his declaration, complaint or
petition."
41 Am.Jur., Section 112, page 368 states:
"But relief will not be granted beyond the fair
scope of the plaintiff's allegation and
prayer."
In the case

of Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. vs.

Blackburn, 188 Kentucky 456, 222 S.W. 99, the Court held that
where petition itemizes the amounts of the various damages,
recovery is limited to the amount specified, notwithstanding
that the evidence might show greater damage.
In Strahm vs. Murry, 199 P.2d 603 (Okla. 1948), the
Court held in a property damage case that:
A judgment for damages in an amount greater
than that sought in the complaint cannot be
sustained,
although
by
the
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Also, in Olwell vs. Nye and Nissen Company, 173 P.2d
652 (Wash, 1947), the Court stated:
It is said by Sutherland, in his work on
damages, (Section 415), that: *
"The controlling part of the complaint
as to the amount of damages is the prayer
for judgment."
And in Sedg. Meas. Dam. (8th Ed. Section
1260) it is said:
" . . . except as fixing a limit beyond
which recovery cannot be had, the averment
of the amount of damages is not a material
one.
In regard to the amount of damages to
be avered, it is only necessary to lay
them so high as to cover the injury: for
no recovery can be had beyond the amount
in the declaration." 3 Sedgwick on Damages,
9th Ed., 2590, Section 1258.
From the foregoing authorities, it is apparent
that the general law adhered to by most states is
that a party cannot recover damages in excess of
that which they have plead in their complaint, although the
Federal Courts are admittedly more liberal in this regard.
The Utah Supreme Court has adhered to the majority rule
which allows the successful party to accept remittitur
rather than requiring a new trial.

In Adair vs. James M. Peterson Ban

61 Utah 159, 211 P. 683 (1922), the Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed the general rule by holding that the plaintiff's
acceptance of remittitur would obviate the need for a new
trial since the verdict had been returned in excess of the
amount prayed for in the complaint.

The Court said:
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In passing on the motion for a new trial the
Court should have required respondent to remit
the Twenty Dollars ($20.00) from the amount of
the judgment and, in case he refused to do so,
to have granted a new trial. Foulger vs. McGrath,
34 Utah 86, 95 P. 1004. It is therefore ordered "
that, in case the respondent shall file with
the Clerk of this Court, within twenty (20)
days after notice of this decision, his consent
to remit the sum of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) as
of the date the judgment was entered, the
judgment will stand affirmed, each party to pay
his own costs on appeal; otherwise, the judgment
is reversed, and a new trial granted, in which
event appellant shall recover its costs on
appeal. Id 61 Utah at 164.
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted the general rule
in principle as shown by its Jury Instruction Forms of Utah,
compiled and edited by members of the Supreme Court

seven

years after the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Preface to this work commences:
The purpose of this is to provide a set of
patterns for jury instructions which may be looked
upon with some degree of assurance as to their
accuracy under the laws of Utah. . .
Section 90.1 of JIFU suggests that an appropriate conclud
paragraph regarding the assessment of damages be:
The amount of damages thus assessed (for
all of the foregoing) must not exceed the sum
of $" ^
, the amount the plaintiff prays for
in (his) complaintT [Emphasis added.)
In addition to the legal authorities cited above, there
are significant policy reasons for enforcing the rule that a
party is limited to the amount of damages prayed for in his
complaint.

The prayer for damages set forth in plaintiff's

complaint must establish the parameters in which the parties
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evaluate the extent of one's injury or damage than the person
who has been so injured or damaged.

In addition, the amount

claimed in a complaint in many circumstances is jurisdictional
in nature and is so significant that unless certain requirements
are met with respect to the jurisdictional amount, a party
cannot proceed.

Although that is not the point in consideration

in the instant case, it does point up the significance and
importance of the ad damnum clause.
One of the most significant problems in tort litigation
relative to the ad damnum clause is that it is the prayer of
the complaint which determines whether or not the defendant
has complete insurance coverage for the alleged loss, or
whether he has an exposure over the policy limits for which he
should retain counsel to represent and protect.

To permit

recovery in excess of the prayer of a complaint would make it
impossible for an insurance company to accurately fulfill its
obligation to its insured to advise him at the commencement of
litigation whether or not he has a personal exposure.

To in

all cases advise that a verdict could be rendered in excess of
the prayer of the complaint would cause many concerned persons
to incur the expense of retaining personal counsel when there
was no actual reason for them to do so in order to be fully
protected against the exceptional circumstances when it might
be necessary or desirable to have retained personal counsel.
In effect, if a verdict in excess of the prayer of the complaint
is permitted to stand, the defendant is deprived of notice of
the total claim
beLibrary,
rendered
him and is
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denied the procedural notice safeguard necessary to due
process of law.
CONCLUSION
An expert witness, in expressing an opinion, may not
assume facts not in evidence.

Such an opinion would be

,f

pulling

itself up by its own boot straps." Wildey's opinion that a
torsion bar had drifted out and allowed the rear axle to move
i

back, causing misalignment and ground induced steering of the
trailer, forcing the tractor off the road, was based solely
upon the photographs, which he acknowledged, seem to show the
torsion bar in place, and further admitted that his opinion
was based on assumptions not shown by the photographs. Thus,
it is clear that his opinion was based upon conjecture from

,

which the jury could not find from a preponderance of the
evidence that a defect caused the accident. He acknowledged
that it was possible that the broken frame bracket could have
been the result of, as well as a cause of the accident.

Where

there are two plausible explanations for the existence of a
fact, for which the defendant could be responsible for only
one cause, plaintiff has not met his burden of proof, and in
order to return a verdict, a jury would have to speculate as to which
explanation was correct.
Substantial prejudicial error was committed in allowing
plaintiff to impeach the testimony of its witness Mason by
plaintiff1s witness Ritchie, when no foundation had been laid
by affording Mason an opportunity to affirm, or even remember
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the impeaching statement.

Likewise, the admission into evidence,

over defendants objection, of two tires showing extensive
"cupping" wear which had been on the trailer prior to the
change in condition of the forward axle effected by the repairs
made by Slim Olson, which, by admission of the plaintiff's
expert, had nothing to do with the accident, greatly prejudiced
defendant's position.
Further, the Trial Court erroneously awarded judgment in
excess of the prayer of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, defendant Bailey's Moving and Storage Company
prays that the judgments awarded against it be reversed, or,
in the alternative, that defendant be awarded a new trial, or,
in the further alternative, that defendant be awarded remititur
of $50,000 on the general damages award.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, WADSWORTH § RUSSON

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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